Abstract-Unutilized spectra, i.e., spectrum holes, are opportunities that may be used for communication or adapting other services that use radio frequency (RF). Such opportunities can also represent an adversarial target, if his objective is to block the RF system from using such opportunities opened by spectrum holes. In this paper, we explore the challenge of finding spectrum holes in an adversarial environment. First, by means of a simple model, we show that an adversary's attack designed to close spectrum holes can be more harmful for the spectrum holes than just random jamming. This calls for designing a scanning strategy to detect such an attack. Second, by applying a gametheoretical model, we design the optimal scanning strategy to detect such attacks. In particular, we show the efficiency of such a scanning strategy compared with uninformed random scanning. This efficiency is achieved by focusing scanning efforts on the bands that will be more likely under attack, and neglecting less promising bands. Beyond the benefits, though, such a strategy has also drawbacks since, if the adversary has a different objective, such as sneaking usage of the spectrum, he can sneak usage undetected by using the bands neglected by such specially tuned scanning. To deal with this problem, third, we suggest to combine this strategy with a strategy that maximizes detection probability in a learning algorithm that updates the beliefs about the adversary's objective. The convergence of the combined algorithm is proven.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N THE future, many disparate types of wireless systems, ranging from communications to radar to navigation systems, will operate in RF-congested environments. In order to cope with the interference associated with such environments, it will be necessary to locate spectrum opportunities, such as spectrum bands that are not occupied by other systems and adapt the configuration of various wireless systems to operate in these alternative spectral bands. Such spectrum opportunities are called spectrum holes and they can be considered as multidimensional regions within frequency, time, and space [1] . Unfortunately, while scanning for unoccupied spectrum might appear to be a straight-forward task, this task is quite difficult for a number of factors, including the large amount of bandwidth to be scanned, the broad geographic area to be monitored, and the fact that the open nature of radio spectrum makes such a system susceptible to different malicious attacks, especially those involving jamming, interference, spectrum sensing data falsification, and primary user emulation attacks. A reader can find comprehensive survey of such threats with solutions to combat those threats in [2] . Different signal processing techniques devoted to detecting an intruder's signal or its source in Cognitive Radio (CR) networks have been studied in textbook [3] .
In this paper, we focus on jamming or interference attacks directed against spectrum opportunities that might open up and be useful to legitimate users. Unfortunately, these holes are easily closed by introducing an interference signal, thereby making the hole suddenly unavailable for legitimate use. This paper examines the question of whether such an attack, focused on the reduction of spectrum holes can be dangerous to the spectrum utilization, and whether the knowledge that such attack might take place can be useful for refining spectrum scanning algorithms. The contributions of this paper are the following:
• First, we show that a focused adversarial attack aimed to maximize damage to spectrum holes can be more harmful to spectrum hole availability than random jamming, thereby suggesting that scanning algorithms should be tailored to detect such an attack.
• Second, by applying a game-theoretical model, we design the optimal scanning strategy aimed to detect maximizing damage attack and show the scanning efficiency compared with random scanning. This efficiency is achieved by focusing scanning efforts on the bands that will be more likely under attack, and neglecting less promising bands. Such anti-maximizing damage scanning strategy has pros and cons. The benefit is an increase in its efficiency to deal with the specific threat of closing a spectrum hole (since it is the best response strategy for such a threat). The drawback is that, if the adversary is instead intent on using the spectrum, he can sneak undetected by using the bands neglected by such a specially-tuned strategy.
• Third, to deal with this drawback we suggest to combine the anti-maximizing damage scanning strategy with a strategy that maximizes detection probability in a learning algorithm that updates the beliefs about the adversary's objective. The convergence of the combined algorithm is proven. The organization of this paper is as follows: In Section II, related works on detecting spectrum holes as well as on employed in this paper game-theoretical concepts are given. In Section III, the mechanism of reducing spectrum opportunities by means of a maximizing damage attack is described. In Section IV, a model for the the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is described, while, in Subsection IV-A, the proposed scanning strategy, which deals with detecting the maximizing damage attack is developed, while in Subsection IV-B, a scanning strategy for detecting a minimizing detection probability attack (i.e. sneaking usage of the spectrum) is devised. In Section V, a problem where only a priori knowledge of the attack is available, is studied. In Section VI, repeated scanning where the beliefs about the adversarial motivation is adapted based on whether a scan failed to detect is investigated. In Section VII conclusions are given, and in the Appendix the proofs of the obtained results are supplied.
II. RELATED WORKS Spectrum sensing is one of the most important steps in the developing new cognitive radio solutions that can improve spectrum utilization since it allows wireless systems to measure and sense the parameters related to channel characteristics as well as to detect temporarily unused spectrum bands (spectrum holes). Thus, spectrum sensing is a detection and classification problem focused on assessing the occupancy of different frequency bands, as well as a better awareness of the surrounding radio environment to improve the efficiency in spectrum sharing and mobile communications [4] . In spectrum sensing, three basic types of detection methods have primarily been explored: energy detection [5] , feature detection [6] and matched filtering [7] .
Feature detection is based on the observation that a transmitted signal can be identified by its cyclostationary features, which are directly related to signal characteristics like modulation type, carrier frequency, and data rate [8] . Matched filter detection requires prior knowledge of the primary user's waveform, and is founded in the same principles as the traditional matched filter detection techniques used in digital receiver design [7] . Energy detection is a common approach to spectrum sensing since it does not require transmitted signal properties, channel information, it has moderate computational complexities, and can be implemented in both the time and frequency domain. The principle of energy detection involves estimating the energy of the received signal and comparing that with a threshold driven by different detection-theoretic criteria [9] . As an example, in [10] , energy detection was developed for a proactive spectrum sensing by incorporating a close-loop power control policy. In [11] , using a hidden Markov model to model cognitive radio activity, a scheme was presented for detecting user activity as well as to learn the channel usage pattern by the user.
The open nature of the radio spectrum makes such a system susceptible to different types of attacks. By the classification framework given in [12] , such attacks can broadly be malicious attacks (the adversary aims to render the CR network inoperative) or selfish attacks (the adversary aims to maximize its own spectrum usage, which might also potentially lead to the CR network shut down). In [13] , the performance limits of collaborative spectrum sensing were investigated where malicious users send false sensing data to the fusion center, leading to increased probability of incorrect sensing results. In [12] , a transmitter verification scheme was suggested to deal with primary user emulation attacks, whereby an adversary transmits signals whose characteristics emulate a primary user's signals. In [14] , a channel selection information hiding scheme was proposed to defend an attack that tracks a user, invalidates network handoffs by preventing a user from maintaining network access, and ultimately breaks down the whole network. This paper will study a problem how an intruder's attack, when focused on the reduction of spectrum holes can be dangerous to spectrum utilization, and whether knowledge that such an attack might take place, can be incorporated into a spectrum scanning algorithm. Similar to methods applied in search theory [15] , here we consider an abstract detection mechanism where we assume that detection probability can be reduced only by mutual interference of the user and the adversary's signals. Further, we consider the problem of the intruder's detection from the point of view that an adversary and an IDS are active agents, each with their own objective. Specifically, the IDS aims to detect the adversary, while the adversary intends to intrude on or damage the utility of spectrum bands. A very convenient tool to deal with such multi-agent problems is game theory. In [16] and [17] , readers can find comprehensive surveys outlining how game-theoretic solutions can be applied to different attacks in wireless networks. In the paper, we use several game-theoretical concepts, namely, matrix games, resource allocation games and Bayesian games. Here, to illustrate such game theoretical concepts, we mention a few such works involving interference or spectrum utilization, grouped by the concepts that are employed.
Matrix games have been applied in [18] to model the communication between two nodes over a wireless link in the presence of an adversary, where the transmitter's goal is to maximize the achievable expected performance of the communication link. In [19] , for a problem of spectrum coexistence in a multiband wireless network, a maxmin transmission protocol for a primary user was presented where the secondary user may choose to be malicious (and, so, have an intent to cause interference) or to be law-obedient. In [20] , for a problem to maximize information flows with network switching in multicast networks. In [21] , to find the optimal allocation of an ambush to prevent infiltration into a protected zone. In [22] , for joint optimization of routing and network coding under conflict free scheduling for multi-source wireless adhoc networks. In [23] , to design a search strategy to prevent infiltration of an intruder to a target.
Resource allocation games were employed in [24] to investigate the problem of secrecy rate optimization in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers where, to improve the achievable secrecy rates, private jammers are employed to generate interference to confuse the eavesdroppers. A network protection problem, that involved a ratio-form contest success function, and for which it is unknown whether the adversary follows a Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium, was investigated in [25] . A jamming defense problem was studied in [26] , which involves a smart jammer that can quickly learn the transmission power of the user and adaptively adjust its transmission power to maximize the damaging effect. A bargaining problem over the fair trade-off between secrecy and throughput in with power allocation OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing) communications was investigated in [27] . A homeland security problem in which terrorists might attack in a strategic or nonstrategic way was explored in [28] , where the attack probabilities of a strategic terrorist are endogenously determined while the attack probabilities of a non-strategic terrorist are exogenously provided. In [29] , "warm up" thresholds for the attack and defense investments were introduced to study the possibility that applying a small amount of resources by the rivals might lead only to a limited effect on the system.
Bayesian games was applied in [30] to model the problem, where a jammer is unaware of the exact positions of the network nodes, but knows the prior distribution of their location. In [31] , the design of a scanning strategy is studied where an adversary intruding into spectrum bands faces the dilemma: the more bandwidth the adversary attempts to use leads to a larger payoff if he is not detected, but at the same time also increases the probability of being detected, and penalized (and thus his malicious activity would be terminated). An anti-jamming Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information is formulated and solved where the user acts as the leader and has the privilege over the smart jammer acting as the follower was solved in [32] . The problem of minimizing the time needed to detect an adversary who has intruded into spectrum for unknown purposes (e.g. file download versus real-time communication) was modeled in [33] . A jamming problem in an underwater acoustic sensor network, where the sensor network maximizes the transmission capacity with uncertainty on the position information of the nodes was suggested in [34] . An anti-jamming strategy versus a low-power jamming attack was developed when intelligence of adversary's attack type is unknown in [35] .
III. ADVERSARY'S ATTACK ON SPECTRUM HOLES
In this section, we formulate a basic attack on spectrum holes. The formulation begins with a wide amount of spectrum that needs to be used by authorized users, as well as the presence of spectrum holes that may opportunistically be used by other, non-adversarial wireless services, such as an adaptive GPS (Global Positioning System). For simplicity, we assume that this spectrum is divided into n separate bands, and that each band may or may not be utilized at any instant by benign users. For example, a particular band might be allocated for continual DTV (Digital TeleVision) usage, while another band might be occasionally used in support of medical purposes. We assume that there is a probability p i that band i is used at any particular instant by a legitimate service. Then, there is a probability 1 − p i that band i is not used at any particular instant. An alternative view for this is that p i describes the frequency with which band i is being used.
We note that the expected time for a legitimate service's signal to be transmitted in band
Thus, 1/ p i can be considered as a measure for the expected duration of a spectrum hole in band i . The larger the frequency p i , the smaller the spectrum hole or, equivalently, the less time that band would provide as a spectrum opportunity for an adaptive system to employ. Thus, frequency p i can also be considered as an inverse measure of the expected spectrum hole and, in the context of this work, the frequency can serve as a cost function for the adaptive RF system associated with the possibility for utilizing that spectrum band: a larger cost yields a reduction in the possibility for that band to be chosen for spectrum utilization and, thus, the sum of all the frequencies across all of the bands can be considered as the total cost of such availability across all the bands.
We assume that the adversary can choose, at any particular instant, to transmit on a single band. In this case, the adversary's strategy is represented as a probability vector y
. . , n be the set of all of the adversary's strategies. Thus, the probability q i that band i is either in use by legitimate users or by the adversary, or both is given as follows:
Thus, if the adversary applies strategy y the total frequency of the bands being in use is given as follows:
This v A ( y) can be considered as a payoff to the adversary, or a cost function for the spectrum. We call such attack with an objective to maximize the payoff v A ( y) (in other words, to maximize frequencies for bands being used) as a maximizing damage attack.
In this paper, we investigate an attack that is focused on the reduction of the size of spectrum holes. Implicitly, we are assuming that the utility of a spectrum hole (regardless of which spectrum band it is on) is directly proportional to the size of the hole (or equivalently, the damage that can be done by the adversary hurting that utility). This is a reasonable assumption since most modern modulation schemes have performance numbers reported in bits-per-second-perHertz (i.e. spectral efficiency). Assuming that the ambient non-adversarial noise levels are uniform across all bands, then one can select an appropriate modulation scheme and arrive at a (maximal) efficiency number (like 4bps/Hz for QAM-16 (Quadrature Amplitude Modulation)) to determine the actual realistic-throughput for each band, and thereby leaving the only relevant performance parameter to be the duration that a band is not occupied (i.e. size of the spectrum hole). We note that in our formulation, we are actually using Shannon capacity for the ideal spectral efficiency. With this in mind, to increase the amount of damage, the adversary aims to increase the frequency with which each of the n bands appears as occupied because this leads to a decrease in the size for all of the spectrum holes, and thereby to a total decrease in the throughput that can be achieved. Hence we use the frequency of a band being used as the basis for quantifying the adversary's objective of disrupting spectrum holes.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all of the bands have different usage probability (frequency), i.e. p i = p j for i = j . Then, without loss of generality we can assume that the bands are arranged in increasing order of their usage probability (frequency):
Theorem 1: In the maximizing damage attack to the spectrum holes, the adversary assigns its transmission to the band that is least-used by legitimate users, i.e., y = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
It is important to note that such an adversary's attack could be more dangerous to the RF spectrum holes than uninformed random jamming attack y R = (1/n, . . . , 1/n) in which the adversary jams all of the bands with equal probability. It follows from the following relations:
IV. THE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
In this section, we consider the situation where the bands are being monitored by some form of IDS (the spectrum scanner, which scans the bands to detect malicious activity. Assuming that the spectrum scanner can only scan a single band at any time, then the strategy for the spectrum scanner can be represented as a probability vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), where x i is the probability that the scanner scans band i . Let
. . , n be the set of all spectrum scanner's strategies.
The adversary can be detected only if he transmits a signal in the same band being scanned by the spectrum scanner. Of course, a signal transmitted by a legitimate user might interfere with the adversary signal making it harder for the the spectrum scanner to distinguish the adversary's signal from a legitimate signal. We describe this important issue in detail. Let the adversary transmit a signal in a band i , that is being scanned by the spectrum scanner during the same time slot. Then (i) If user i does not transmit a signal (this takes place with probability 1 − p i ), then there is no interference with the adversary's signal. In the absence of such interference, the spectrum scanner can detect the adversary's signal with certainty, i.e., with probability 1.
If user i transmits a signal (occurring with probability p i ), then it interferes with the adversary's signal. We assume that three outcomes might arise:
(ii-A) The signal interference does not reduce the spectrum scanner's detection capability, i.e., the detection probability is still equal to 1; (ii-B) The signal interference could completely diminish the spectrum scanner's detection capability, i.e., the detection probability becomes equal to zero; (ii-C) The signal interference might partly reduce the spectrum scanner's detection ability since it cannot distinguish the adversarial signal from a legal signal. We assume that the probability of detecting the adversary signal if it interferes with legal user's signal is α where α ∈ [0, 1]. Note that case (ii-C) coincides with case (ii-A) for α = 1, and it coincides with case (ii-B) for α = 0. Also, the probability α could be interpreted as a coefficient that characterizes the spectrum scanner's robustness to signal interference.
This yields that the probability to be undetected Pr U i (x, y) in band i , if the spectrum scanner and the adversary apply strategies x and y, is:
Then, the detection probability Pr Di (x, y) = 1 − Pr U i (x, y) is given as:
A. Maximizing Damage Sneaking Attack
In this section, we consider a "smart" adversarial behaviour where the adversary is attempting to maximize damage to spectrum holes while also remaining undetected (because, if detected, then he could be subject to a severe penalty or even terminated). To reflect the trade-off between these two objectives for a "smart" adversary's behaviour, we can define the payoff to the adversary as follows:
For simplicity, we call an attack associated with this payoff as a maximizing damage sneaking attack. The spectrum scanner wants to detect the adversarial signal. Then, as a payoff for the spectrum scanner, the detection probability is:
We assume that the rivals know the coefficient of robustness, α, as well as the frequencies { p i }.
With these payoffs, we may now formulate the scanning problem in the context of an adversarial setting. Namely, we look for a Nash equilibrium strategy. Recall that [36] , a pair of strategies (x * , y * ) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for any (x, y), the following inequalities hold:
To differentiate this scenario from the maximizing damage case where there is no IDS, we call this game a maximizing damage sneaking game. Since v A is concave in y, and v S is linear in x, there is at least one equilibrium [36] . Theorem 2 proves that the equilibrium is unique, and provides it in closed form. To formulate the result we introduce the following auxiliary notations:
with ϕ n+1 = ∞,
and ψ 1 = 0, and
Theorem 2: The maximizing damage sneaking game has a unique equilibrium (x, y), and it is given by case (A) and case (B) as follows:
(A) Let k be given as follows:
Then
and
(B) Let k be given as follows:
is the unique root of the equation
Note that, ψ i < ϕ i < ψ i+1 for any i due to ν i being strictly decreasing. Thus, k is uniquely defined by (12) and (15) .
Theorem 2 also allows us to obtain the detection probability P D in closed form as:
An interesting property of the adversary's strategy is that the adversary focuses the attack on a subset of bands {1, . . . , k}, which reflects a tradeoff between carefully administering its interference and the risk of being detected. On one hand, a larger k (and thus a larger number of bands to choose from for interference) might reduce the risk of being detected.
On the other hand, though, a larger k might also reduce the impact the interference as less valuable bands are available for choosing to interfere with. Of course, since no other threats are expected, the spectrum scanner, to increase its scanning efficiency, also must focus its efforts on the subset {1, . . . , k}. Case (A) and Case (B) of Theorem 2 reflect two types of scanning strategies: (a) total scanning, and (b) scanning with a chance left for the adversary to be undetected. Total scanning strategy does not leave any chance for the adversary's activity to be undetected, all of the bands that might be under attack must be scanned (and hence need a non-zero scanning probability). Since the detection probability is positive, such a strategy yields detection of the adversary in a finite number of time slots in the repeated scenario of the game. Meanwhile, scanning with with a chance left for the adversary to be undetected leaves a chance that the adversary's intrusion escapes detection, since the switching band k is not scanned, though it might be attacked. The rationale behind such a strategy is that the spectrum scanner entices the adversary to attack bands {1, . . . , k −1}, but to apply a smaller (i.e. less likely) attacking effort to the unscanned band k since it is not as attractive for the attack's purpose. Such strategy allows the spectrum scanner to focus his scanning effort on a smaller number of bands to scan. In this situation, the detection probability also is positive. Thus, in the repeated scenario, in spite of there being a chance left for the attack to be undetected, the adversary will also be detected in a finite number of time slots.
As a numerical illustration, let us consider the case with n = 5 bands and with the frequencies p = (0.01, 0.1, p 3 , 0.3, 0.4) associated with the bands being used by users. We vary p 3 over several values, p 3 = 0.12, 0.2, 0.28, to reflect three specific cases: p 3 is close to p 2 , or it is close to p 4 , or it takes an intermediate value between p 2 and p 4 . The robustness coefficient α varies from zero to 1. the switching band k is 3 for case (A) and 4 for case (B). Thus, for all of the cases band 5 is not interesting from the adversary point of view, and this thus guides the spectrum scanner to not scan this band. Figure 1(d) illustrates that the adversary's payoff decreases with an increase in the robustness coefficient α, and it increases with an increase in user's activity. Figure 1(c) illustrates that the spectrum scanner's payoff decreases with an increase in user's activity. Also, it illustrates the difference between total scanning (case (A)), and scanning with a chance left for the adversary to be undetected (case (B)). In case (A), the spectrum scanner payoff increases with an increase in robustness coefficient (this also follows from (11) and 19), while, in case (B), the spectrum scanner payoff decreases with an increase in the robustness coefficient (this also follows from (18) and 19). In spite of this decrease in detection probability, we observe a decrease in the adversary's payoff. Thus, what is observed is a sacrificing in the detection probability to reduce the damage to the spectrum holes, much like in chess how a player sacrifices a piece to win a game.
Figures 2 (b) and (c) illustrate that the spectrum scanner strategy is less sensitive to the robustness coefficient than the adversary's strategy, while both of them are sensitive to the users' activity in the bands. Figure 2 (a) illustrates the efficiency of the scanning strategy x compared with the uninformed random scanning strategy x U = (1/n, . . . , 1/n), Namely, it depicts the ratio v S (x, y)/v S (x U , y) of the corresponding detection probabilities.
B. Sneaking Attack
The benefit of the scanning strategy x (Theorem 2) is that it is the best response for the adversarial strategy aimed to damage spectrum holes. This efficiency is achieved by focusing scanning efforts on the band which will be more probably attacked. Meanwhile, such focused efforts also are a drawback of this strategy since, if the adversary has an intention to sneak usage of bandwidth, he can safely sneak into bands by choosing those bands which are not going to be scanned by strategy x. To deal with this challenge the IDS can combine strategy x with a different strategy that considers scanning the rest of the bands. Thus, in this section, we consider a different type of adversary's attack where his objective is to minimize the probability of being detected. We call such attack a sneaking attack. For such an adversarial objective, the reduction of the possibility for spectrum utilization is merely a by-product. The spectrum scanner wants to maximize detection probability. Thus, the payoff to the spectrum scanner is v S (x, y) with v S given by (7), while for the adversary it is the cost function. This is a zero-sum game. We call such a game as a sneaking game. This game relates to so called diagonal matrix games [37] , [38] . Recall that (x * , y * ) is an equilibrium (saddle point) [38] in zero-sum games if and only if the following inequalities hold for any strategies x and y:
Theorem 3: The sneaking game has the unique equilibrium (x, y) given as follows;
with ν n given by (11). The equilibrium payoff, i.e., the equilibrium detection probability is P D = ν n . The equilibrium strategies are noticeably different from the one where the adversary aimed to bring the maximal damage to spectrum holes (Theorem 2). Namely, to minimize detection probability the adversary has to use all possible spectrum bands to interfere. To meet this challenge, the spectrum scanner also has to apply a total scanning strategy that equalizes the detection probability across all of the bands. This strategy does not leave a chance for the adversary to sneak undetected. Although such a strategy is quite efficient, it is not so efficient against the adversary strategy aimed at bringing the maximal damage to spectrum holes (when compared to the spectrum scanner in Theorem 2). This is illustrated by Figure 3 , which depicts the ratio v S (x 2 , y 2 )/v S (x 3 , y 2 ) of the corresponding detection probabilities, where (x 2 , y 2 ) is the equilibrium given by Theorem 2 and x 3 is scanning strategy given by Theorem 3.
V. INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT THE ADVERSARY'S ATTACK TYPE
In this section, we consider the scenario where the spectrum scanner does not have complete knowledge as to whether there is an adversary present. Further, if the adversary is present, the spectrum scanner does not know what kind of attack the adversary intends to apply, or in other words, what the objective of the adversary's attack is. The spectrum scanner has only a priori knowledge about the adversary's status, i.e.
• with a priori probability q 1 the adversary is present and might apply a maximizing damage sneaking attack, • with a priori probability q 2 the adversary is present and might be apply a sneaking attack • with a priori probability q 0 = 1 − q 1 − q 2 the adversary is not be present. The payoff to the spectrum scanner is the detection probability. The adversary, of course, knows its attack type. To deal with this situation mathematically, associate an adversary type to the attack being employed. Namely, the adversary of type follows the maximizing damage sneaking attack, and the adversary of type 2 follows the sneaking attack.
Let y k be a strategy for the adversary of type k with k = 1, 2. Let x be a spectrum scanner's strategy. Then, the (expected) payoff to the spectrum scanner is given by
with v S given by (7) . The payoff to the adversary of type 1 is given by v 1 A = v A (x, y) with v A given by (6) . Since v S , given by (7), is detection probability, then the payoff to the adversary of type 2 is given by v 2 A = 1 − v S (x, y). This is a Bayesian game [36] . We look for a (Bayesian) equilibrium. Recall that (x * , y 1 * , y 2 * ) is a (Bayesian) equilibrium if and only if for any (x, y 1 , y 2 ) the following inequalities hold:
Since v S is linear on x, v 1 A is concave in y 1 and v 2 A is linear in y 2 , the game has an equilibrium [36] . The following theorem proves its uniqueness and also gives it in closed form.
Theorem 4: In the considered game, two types of equilibrium scanning strategies might arise: total scanning strategy and scanning that is focused against the maximizing damage sneaking attack.
(a i ) Let k be such that (12) holds. Also,
Then the equilibrium strategy focuses against the maximizing damage sneaking attack. Namely, equilibrium strategies x and y 1 are given by (13) and (14), and y 2 is any probability vector such that
(a ii ) Let k be such that (15) hold and ν be given by (18) . Also,
Then, the scanning strategy focuses against the maximizing damage sneaking attack. Namely, the equilibrium strategies x and y 1 are given by (16) and (17),
given by (18) , and y 2 is any probability vector such that
(b) If the conditions for cases (a i ) and (a ii ) do not hold, then the equilibrium scanning strategy involves total scanning, so it addresses both types of attacks, and
with
where 0 < ω < 1 − p 1 and 0 < θ < 1 are the unique solutions of the equations:
(33) The roots of the equations (31) can be found by superposition of bisection methods based on the following properties of X and Y .
(
Otherwise let θ be the unique positive root of the equation
has a root, which is unique, if and only if
This θ also can be determined by the bisection method. Thus, the spectrum scanner as well as the adversary performing maximizing damage sneaking attack always have the unique equilibrium strategies. While for the adversary who follows a sneaking attack, multiple equilibria might arise. In this case, the detection probability does not depend on the adversary's equilibrium strategy. That is, all of these adversary strategies are equivalent to each other. This is similar to zerosum games [36] , where all the equilibrium strategies return the same payoff, and hence in the considered game the problem of selection of an equilibrium strategy does not arise.
The expected detection probability of both types of the attack is given by
Detection probability of type k (k = 1 and 2) attack are given as follows:
Thus, in case (a i ) and case (a ii ), the spectrum scanner does not consider the sneaking attack to be a dangerous and promising one from the point of view of its detection. That is why, the scanner focuses all of his efforts against the possibility of the maximizing damage attack. Meanwhile, in case (b), the spectrum scanner considers both types of the attack as dangerous, and the scanner adjusts its scanning effort to address both attacks.
The conditions (23) and (25) of applying a total scanning strategy is quite intuitive: if the detection probability associated with the maximizing damage attack, based on a priori knowledge, is greater than the detection probability associated with the sneaking attack, then the spectrum scanner should focus its scanning to prevent the maximizing damage attack.
Figures 1 (a) and (b) illustrate which case (A) or (B) of Theorem 2 holds. For p 3 = 0.2 case (B) holds for any α, for p 3 = 0.12 case (A) switches to case (B) with an increase of α while for for p 3 = 0.28 the switching takes place in reverse order. For p 3 = 0.2 and p 3 = 0.28 the switching band k is 4 independently on the cases (A) and (B), while for p 3 = 0.12 the switching band k is 3 for case (A) and 4 for case (B). Thus, for all the cases band 5 is not interesting for the adversary. That is why the spectrum scanner also will not scan it. Figure 1(d) illustrates that the adversary's payoff decreases with an increase in robustness coefficient α, and it increases with an increase in user's activity. Figure 1(c) illustrates that the spectrum scanner's payoff decreases with an increase in user's activity. Also, it illustrates the difference between total scanning (case (A)), and scanning with a chance left for the adversary to be undetected (case (B)). In case (A), the spectrum scanner payoff increases with an increase in robustness coefficient (this also follows from (11) and 19), while, in case (B), the spectrum scanner payoff decreases with an increase in robustness coefficient (this also follows from (18) and 19). In spite of this decrease in detection probability we observe a decrease in the adversary's payoff. Thus, sacrificing detection probability to reduce the damage to the spectrum holes, like in chess a player sacrifices a figure to win a game.
Figures 4(a) and (b) illustrate which case (a i ), (a ii ) or (b) of Theorem 4 holds. Figure 4(c) shows that an increase in robustness coefficient yields an increase in (expected) detection probability. Also, an increase in a priori probability q 1 that the maximizing damage attack is expected implies an increase in (expected) detection probability since against such attack more focused scanning effort can be applied. Figures 4(c) and (d) and Figure 5 (a) illustrate that the adversary's payoff is more sensitive to robustness coefficient and a priori probability about the adversary's type than the payoff to the spectrum scanner. Figures 5(b)-(d) illustrate a reduction in sensitivity to the payoff the spectrum scanner achieves by means of higher sensitivity of the scanning strategy compared with the adversary's strategies.
VI. REPEATED SCANNING WITH ADAPTED BELIEFS
In this section, we extend the single time slot scanning problem to the case of multiple time slots as a repeated game in time slots t = 1, 2, . . .. At the beginning of each time slot, the rivals can adapt their a priori probabilities. Denote by q k t , k ∈ {0, 1, 2} for the time slot t, the adapted probabilities associated with the belief whether the adversary applies the maximizing damage attack, or sneaking attack, or he is not present in the network, where q k for the time slot t + 1 are given as follows: Larger values for spectrum scanner's robustness leads to faster stabilization of the belief. If the a priori probability that the adversary might not be present in the network is positive, then the belief that the adversary is not present increases as failed attempts to detect the adversary accumulate.
The following theorem proves that the algorithm converges.
Theorem 5:
The learning algorithm with a priori probabilities adapted by (36) converges.
(a) Let the initial a priori probability of the adversary being present be positive, i.e., q 0 1 > 0. Then, q 0 t tends to 1 increasingly, while q 1 t and q 2 t tends to zero. Also, there is no such t 0 that v S (x t , y 2 t ) = 0 for t ≥ t 0 . (b) Let initial a priori probability of the adversary to be present in the network be zero, i.e., q 0 1 = 0. Then, q 2 t is increasing and q 1 t is decreasing in such a way that
This theorem has some interesting consequences: (i) If the initial a priori probability that the adversary is not present in the bands being monitored is positive, then the spectrum scanner becomes inclined to believe in the absence of the malicious attack as the time increases that the adversary has not been detected.
(ii) Let the initial a priori probability that the adversary is not present be zero. Then, the spectrum scanner becomes inclined to believe that the adversary follows the sneaking arrack (which is more difficult to detect) as the time increases that the adversary has not been detected.
(iii) For each band there is no a finite time slot such that the band never will be scanned with certainty after this time slot.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated how an adversary may attempt to direct an attack that is aimed at closing spectrum holes so as to reduce the possibility of spectrum utilization by a legitimate entity employing an adaptive RF service. We developed a game-theoretical formulation involving a spectrum scanner and an adversary. In this model, the adversary might aim to close spectrum holes either (a) as the main goal of his attack, or (b) as a side effect of its attack. We have showed that the optimal scanning strategy essentially depends on the attack the spectrum scanner faces as well as on the a priori knowledge of such attack. In particular, by incorporating such knowledge in the scanning algorithm it is possible to focus the effort on specific bands which should be scanned. This, in turn, might yield an increase in the detection probability, and consequently in the efficiency of the scanning algorithm. Further, an adaptive learning algorithm was developed in which the rivals adapt their a priori knowledge, and the convergence of the algorithm is proven. A goal of our future work is to incorporate adaptation in the underlying usage frequencies associated with each band, investigate more sophisticated adversarial behavior, where the adversary might change the type of attack, or even combine legal activity with malicious activity in the spectrum.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
Since v A ( y) is linear on y and A is a n-dimensional simplex, the optimal strategy y = arg y∈ A max v A ( y) focuses its efforts on a band i = arg i max (1 − p i ). By (2), this is i = 1, and the result follows.
Proof of Theorem 2
Since v A is concave in y, and v S is linear in x, there is at least one equilibrium [36] . We find the equilibrium in closed form and prove its uniqueness by means of a constructive proof. To do so, first we give a necessary and sufficient condition that a pair of strategies (x, y) is an equilibrium, and then this is the only pair of strategies (x, y) that satisfies this condition.
To give necessary and sufficient conditions that a couple of strategies (x, y) is an equilibrium, we note that x and y are equilibrium strategies if and only if they are the best response to each other, i.e., they are solutions to the best response equations:
Then, due to v A (x, y) being concave in y, and v S (x, y) is linear in x, the necessary and sufficient conditions that (x, y) is an equilibrium is that there are ω (a Lagrange multiplier) and ν (the maximal detection probability) such that ∂v (38) and (39),
,
Thus, we have separately to consider two cases: (A) there exists a k such that
(A) Let (40) hold. Then, by (i)-(ii),
(42)
Since x is a probability vector, summing up (42) yields that 1
Thus,
Then, substituting this ω into (40) implies that the following inequalities must hold:
Since y is a probability vector, summing up (43) yields that ν = ν k . Then, (a) follows by substituting this ν into (45).
(B) Let (40) hold. Then, by (i)-(iii),
(in particular, x k = 0), and
Since y is a probability vector, by (47), y k = 1 − k−1 i=1 y i . Substituting this y k into (47) implies that y i ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , k (so, y is a probability vector) if and only if
Since x is a probability vector, summing up (46) yields that
Note that F is decreasing in ν. Thus, the last equation has a unique root if and only if F(ν k ) ≥ 1 ≥ F(ν k−1 ), and (b) follows. Also, we note the proof implies that a pair of strategies (x, y) given by (a) and (b) is the only one satisfying the necessary and sufficient conditions (38) and (39). Thus, besides finding the equilibrium strategies (x, y) we have proven the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 3
Due to v S (x, y) is linear on x and y, by (7) and (20), the x and y are equilibrium's strategies if and only if
Thus, (49) and (50) imply that x i > 0 and y i > 0 for any i . Then, by (49) and (50),
. This, and the fact that x and y are probability vectors yield the result.
Proof of Theorem 4
Since v 1 A (x, y 1 ) is concave in y 1 , v 2 A (x, y 2 ) is linear in y 2 and v S (x, y 1 , y 2 ) is linear in x, (x, y 1 , y 2 ) is a solution to the best response equations if and only if there are ω (a Lagrange multiplier), and ν (the maximal expected detection probability), θ (the minimal detection probability) such that
It is clear that ω > 0, ν > 0 and θ ≥ 0. Two cases have to be considered separately: (I) x i > 0 for any i , and (II) there is an i such that x i = 0.
(I) Let x i > 0 for any i . Thus, by (52),
(54) Then, due to y 1 and y 2 being probability vectors, (54) yields that
By ( (53) and (54),
Solving these relations implies that
and i has to belong to I 10 given by (30) .
(ii) Let y 2 i > 0, y 1 i = 0. Then, by (51), (53) and (54),
and i has to belong to I 01 given by (30) .
Also, since y 1 i > 0 and y 2 i > 0, i has to belong to I 11 given by (30) .
By (i)-(iii), (27) , (28) and (29) follow. The optimal value of ω and θ can be found from the fact that x and y 1 are probability vectors, i.e., X (ω, θ ) := 
(B) there exists a k such that
(A) Let (59) hold. Then, by (51), (52) and (53),
Since y 1 is a probability vector, (63) yields (14) , and ν = q 1 ν k . Then, since x is a probability vector, (61) implies (13) and (12) . Due to the fact that y 2 is a probability vector, by (63), we have that
Then, since, ν = q 1 ν k ,
The last inequality is equivalent to
.
and (23), as well as, (a i ) follow.
(B) Let (60) hold. Then, by (51), (52) and (53),
is such that
Since, y 1 and y 2 are probability vectors, by (65), q 1 ν k ≤ ν ≤ q 1 ν k−1 . Let
Then, since x is a probability vector, such ν is defined uniquely by (18) , and (16) and (17) follow. Note that, by (65) and (67), since y 1
Then, by (66) and (67), y 2 has to be a probability vector such that
Thus, such a probability vector y 2 exists if and only if
and (25) follows, as well as (a ii ).
Thus, q 0
